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Digital Nationalism on Weibo on the 
70th Chinese National Day 
Dechun Zhang,1 Leiden University, Netherlands 
Abstract: China’s digital nationalism has been on the rise during the last decade. This article examines the digital 
nationalistic expression of solidarity and unity on China’s 70th National Day celebration in 2019. It conducted a 
qualitative content analysis of 500 posts regarding China’s National Day, which were posted on October 1, 2019, on 
Sina Weibo. This study finds that Chinese internet users employ textual and visual posts to express their pride and 
loyalty, thereby reflecting their Chinese identity, a call for national unity, and their best wishes for China’s bright 
future. This study suggests that Weibo offers a virtual “imagined community” for netizens to interact with national 
symbols to spontaneously strengthen a sense of national identity by highlighting the Chinese Communist Party’s 
achievements. The findings concluded that national identity is socially constructed, rather than being permanent. 
Moreover, the Internet facilitates a more liberating Chinese media system; however, digital media is also somehow 
influenced by the Chinese government’s media logic, which helps to further disseminate the government’s interests.  
Keywords: Social Media, China, Digital Nationalism, Imagined Community, National Identity 
Introduction 
cholars have focused tremendous attention on nationalism over the last decades, 
especially since the collapse of the Soviet Union (Friend and Thayer 2017). China is no 
exception. Zhang, Liu, and Wen (2018) suggested that China’s digital nationalism is on 
the rise; meanwhile, there is a belief that the internet facilitates a growing digital nationalism in 
China (Leibold 2010; Zhang, Liu, and Wen 2018). Although the Chinese media and online 
platforms are highly surveilled and controlled by the Chinese government (Brady 2008), digital 
media still plays a vital role in collective nationalistic actions and political expression (Hyun, 
Kim, and Sun 2014; Hyun and Kim 2015). Leibold (2010) posited that China’s internet is full of 
aggressive nationalism, and that digital media could have a significant impact on domestic and 
international politics (Reilly 2012). 
Hyun, Kim, and Sun (2014) proffered that the development of media technologies could 
also play a role in developing a sense of global interconnectivity and national insularity. Despite 
this, the internet can connect people across geographical spaces (Castells 2008), and promote a 
sense of nationalism (Eriksen 2007). Fang and Repnikova (2018) proposed that Chinese 
nationalistic expressions normally feature a top-down and bottom-up type of expression in 
digital media. This means that digital nationalism in China is not only supported by the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP), but it is also supported by the public (Liu 2010), which demonstrates 
its grassroots feature (Hyun and Kim 2015). Although state-led digital nationalism and 
grassroots-oriented nationalism differ (Hyun and Kim 2015), they also share a common goal in 
that they both promote national identity and interests via the digital media (Nossek 2004).  
Overall, digital nationalism in China is on the rise (Zhang, Liu, and Wen 2018); yet, online 
nationalistic activities can trigger radical violence in real life (Schneider 2018a). For example, 
since the conflicts over the Diaoyu Islands between China and Japan, Chinese netizens have 
organized several activities to vandalize Japanese car brands in China (Schneider 2018a). This 
kind of online nationalistic expression in China is obviously uncivil and has promoted radical 
policies among anti-Japanese nationalists (Fang and Repnikova 2018; Schneider 2018b). 
1 Corresponding Author: Dechun Zhang, Matthias de Vrieshof 3, The Leiden University Institute for Area Studies, 
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However, one study suggested that the nationalism expressed in Weibo is multifaceted and 
contain both pro-regime and criticism of domestic political conditions (Zhang, Liu, and Wen 
2018). Due to contrasting accounts, it is vital to explore the expression of nationalism and the 
strategies that netizens utilize.  
Meanwhile, most of the previous studies examined the political ideology of search engines 
(Jiang 2014), websites (Schneider 2018b), and online forums (Fang and Repnikova 2018), with 
relatively fewer studies examining the role of Sina Weibo, which contains 47.6 percent of all 
social media posts in China (Fu, Chan, and Chau 2013) expressing digital nationalism. Zhang, 
Liu, and Wen (2018) examined over 6,000 posts from 146 users at Sina Weibo; however, they 
only examined the expression of opinion leaders (with a large number of followers), yet ignored 
the systematic examination of expressions representing all netizens. This article discovered 
limited empirical studies examining the relationship between Weibo and nationalism. 
Meanwhile, the previous studies mostly focused on the role of the government in digital 
nationalism (Schneider 2018b), the political ideology of nationalism (Jiang 2014) and the effect 
of digital nationalism (Shen and Guo 2013). However, even fewer studies explored the 
nationalistic expressions and tactics used by netizens. Hence, the research question is raised: 
“How were expressions related to national identity and solidarity articulated, manifested and 
mobilized on Weibo during the period of the 70th National Day Anniversary of China?”  
To answer this research question, this article followed Oruc’s (2019) suggestion and 
conducted a qualitative content analysis on Sina Weibo posts regarding the celebration of the 
National Day in China which was posted on October 1, 2019. This represents the seventieth 
year of China under the rule of the CCP; therefore, the Chinese government arranged a series of 
activities to celebrate this achievement with the highlight being a military parade. Sina Weibo is 
the largest social media platform in China (Zhang, Liu, and Wen 2018), which offered a sphere 
for users to celebrate the National Day online. Meanwhile, the National Day acts as a symbol to 
rekindle citizens’ memory of the state’s history and increase its symbolic attachment to the 
nation (Ariely 2017). Hence, this article will utilize posts concerning the 70th Chinese National 
Day celebration from Sina Weibo to accurately answer the research question. Considering the 
popularity of Sina Weibo, this article identified relevant hashtags and manually searched them 
to locate relevant posts. Next, the article cleaned the data and randomly selected 500 posts 
referencing the National Day, along with relevant hashtags.  
The article begins with the literature review that is focused on nationalism and the media, 
followed with a summary of the previous study on China’s digital nationalism. Next, this article 
reports on the various themes of the posts, as well as the strategies users utilized by analyzing 
500 relevant posts’ text and visual content. Finally, all the results will be reported and 
discussed. 
Literature Review 
Nationalism, National Identity, and the Internet 
Although there are numerous empirical studies on nationalism, it is difficult to define 
nationalism clearly. Nationalism, as a word, was first mentioned in 1409 (Kecmanovic 1996); 
Many scholars further elaborated on the definition of nationalism after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union (Friend and Thayer 2017). However, due to the complex and multi-dimensional nature, 
the definition of nationalism differs depending upon how scholars define the nation as a 
community (Oruc 2019). Anderson (2006) defined nationalism as a sense of belonging to an 
imagined community. His idea is that most community members do not know each other, but 
community members believe they “live the image of communion” (Anderson 2006, 6). Through 
this perspective, national identity refers to “bonds of solidarity among members of the 
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members’ belief in the commonality of “culture, history, kinship, language, religion, territory 
and destiny” plays a distinctive role in constructing a sense of national identity. Hence, Smith 
(1991) defined nationalism as a sense of belonging to a country and their willingness to keep 
the country independent and safe. However, Anderson (2006) further highlighted the nation as 
an imagined community, while Smith (1991) focused on the myths, memories, values, and 
symbols in the study of nationalism. Meanwhile, it is challenging to establish a line between 
nationalism and national identity. Billig (1995) proposed that nationalism contains the process 
of building a sense of national identity for those who are said to live in their own nation. 
Furthermore, Giddens (1985) posited that national symbols also play a role in nationalist 
feelings and expressions, such as during the National Day (Ariely 2017). 
Hall (1996) suggested that identity could be constructed through specific discourse and 
enunciative tactics based on special historical and institutional social contexts. To effectively 
construct national identity, the constructedness of a national identity should be embedded in 
daily life in a natural way (Özkırımlı 2000). Therefore, Rusciano (2003) suggested that culture 
plays a vital role in constructing national identity, such as language and history (Hall 1996; 
Rusciano 2003). Meanwhile, with the plurality of political, historical, and social contexts, there 
is no universal standard to define and construct nationalism (Özkırımlı 2000). Thus, Özkırımlı 
(2000) posited that language, history, and ethnicity are significant elements to construct a sense 
of nationalism; however, it is difficult to include all elements. Hence, nationalist discourse is a 
salient factor for examining the various forms of nationalism (Özkırımlı 2000), which serve as a 
common denominator (Oruc 2019). Therefore, Özkırımlı (2000) argued that there are three 
common features of nationalist discourse: national interests are the most important; the nation is 
the only legal agency to rule; and the significant differences between them and us.  
Due to the development of communication technologies, the internet plays a vital role in 
constructing a sense of nationalism (Eriksen 2007). Conversi (2012) submitted that the internet 
can facilitate globalization communication, which not only allows users free access, but also 
“enabled individuals to create ad hoc micro- and even macro-communities, which can either 
transcend or reinforce ethnic boundaries” (Conversi 2012, 1360). Therefore, Conversi (2012) 
argued that it leads to the emergence of virtual ethnic communities. The members of virtual 
ethnic communities interact through digital media based on their putative common descent 
(Conversi 2012), which is an expansion of imagined communities (Anderson 2006). 
Meanwhile, the National Day could play a role as a symbol to remind citizens of their past with 
a focus on people who sacrificed something for the nation (Ariely 2017). Thus, Ariely (2017) 
posited that the National Day visualizes and vocalizes the symbolic attachment to the nation, 
encouraging people to remember and re-define their national history, which could promote a 
more emotional attachment to the nation and a sense of national identity (Smith 1991). Hence, it 
could be argued that the National Day celebrations stimulate citizens’ shared memory, which 
format and bolster an “imagined community.” Anderson (2006) proposed that imagined 
community members can share the same experiences and memory, although they do not know 
each other and without face-to-face communication. Meanwhile, Anderson (2006) also 
suggested that the media play a role in forming a nationalistic consciousness and forge a 
national identity by circulating shared symbols by promoting the emergence of imaginary 
communities. However, since the development of digital media, traditional media are not the 
only sources for the public to gain information; digital media have also produced meaningful 
and creative works in China, especially over the last few years (Schneider 2018b). Therefore, it 
is obvious that digital media play a substantial role by enhancing the dissemination of 
nationalism. In order to explore the role of digital media in Chinese nationalism, this article 
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Chinese Digital Nationalism and Online Activities 
Digital media play an important role in promoting a national identity and interests (Nossek 
2004), and China is certainly no exception. Despite the Chinese internet being highly controlled 
and surveilled by the government (Boas 2006; Brady 2008), digital media, like online forums 
and social networking sites, are available for Chinese citizens to arrange political online 
activities (Fang and Repnikova 2018). According to the China Internet Network Information 
Center (CNNIC 2019), there are 854 million internet users in China. Simultaneously, the 
number of microblog users have increased significantly during the last decade, from 63 million 
in 2010 to 350 million in 2018 (Statista 2018). Meanwhile, there are 139,270 government 
microblog accounts as of June 2019 (CNNIC 2019). Fang and Repnikova (2018) argued that 
China’s digital nationalism contains state-led propaganda; however, many nationalistic 
expressions reflect a sense of sentiment and movement, which differ from state-led nationalism 
and, thus, should conclude the existence of digital activism. 
Previous studies concerning China’s nationalism focused on state-led nationalism, which 
highlighted the Chinese government’s effort in promoting pragmatic nationalism via patriotic 
education and media campaigns (Zhao 1998). In terms of digital nationalism in China, 
Schneider (2018b) proffered that the Chinese government supports radical nationalistic 
expression regarding the Second Sino-Japanese War. Meanwhile, Jiang (2014) determined that 
Chinese search engines follow the political logic of the Chinese government, which filter the 
information that is negative to China. However, some studies examined how the nationalist 
expression of Chinese youth could lead to destabilizing the CCP government and influence 
China’s foreign policy (Yan and Zheng 2012). Meanwhile, one study examined the ideology 
behind online political discourse by analyzing over 6,000 posts relating to China’s foreign 
policies on Weibo (Zhang, Liu, and Wen 2018). They found that online nationalistic discourse 
is on the rise; however, the online nationalistic expressions contained both pro-regime and 
critical commentary of China (Zhang, Liu, and Wen 2018). 
Most of the studies highlight the role of government. However, Jiang (2014) posited that 
cyber-nationalism in China reveals a sign of becoming a two-tiered system with features of 
centralizing and decentralizing, which means it not only reflects the points of the Chinese 
government, but also netizens’ perspectives. For instance, one study defines China’s digital 
nationalism as a “spontaneous version of nationalism online” (Hyun and Kim 2015, 768). 
Leibold (2016) also argued that digital nationalistic discourse promotes a sense of Han 
supremacy, which validates that the Han ethnicity is dominant among all the 56 ethnic groups in 
China, which is in stark contrast with China’s ethnic policies. Furthermore, some existing 
studies also suggest that digital nationalistic discourse promotes radical foreign policies, such as 
the relationship between China and Japan (Liu 2006; Schneider 2018b). Thus, Chinese digital 
nationalism is “understood as a radicalized expression of national identity that is rooted in 
antagonism toward other nations (deemed as enemies) and ethnic groups” (Fang and Repnikova 
2018, 2165). Additionally, Han (2015) suggested that nationalistic expressions reveal features 
of patriotism. Therefore, although previous studies highlighted the role of the government’s role 
or influence in China’s digital nationalism, it also reflects the grassroots impact on digital 
nationalism. 
The two-tiered feature of digital nationalism demonstrates contested “expressions and 
imageries of the nation between radical voices and the party-state” (Fang and Repnikova 2018, 
2166). Anderson (2006) surmised that the media play a vital role in creating “imagined 
communities.” Hyun, Kim, and Sun (2014) suggested that there is a close correlation between 
the internet and digital nationalism in China. They suggested that the internet offers Chinese 
netizens an opportunity to funnel their nationalistic emotions by arranging digital activities such 
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Sun 2014). Meanwhile, Fang and Repnikova (2018) also suggested that the nationalistic digital 
activities provide diverse online groups the opportunity to express pro-unification dialogues, but 
also offer a space for blind allegiance to the party-state. Hence, digital nationalism in China has 
become a fierce battleground for different online groups evoking uncivil expressions (Fang and 
Repnikova 2018). Thus, in order to understand China’s digital nationalistic activities, this article 
will explore the nature of political online expressions in China. 
Digital Media and Online Expressions 
Nationalistic online discourse in China reflects the government’s position; yet, it also 
demonstrates a growing grassroots movement (Hyun, Kim, and Sun 2014). Thus, unlike the 
government’s pragmatic nationalism (Zhao 1998), nationalistic enthusiasm in digital media 
reflects the Chinese populace’ desire, and mixed memory of China’s glorious and humiliating 
history, which suffered from foreign countries over the past 100 years (Hyun, Kim, and Sun 
2014). Therefore, the digital media offer a space for netizens to express their political 
ideologies. However, the previous study suggests that the engaging level of online expression in 
China is low. More specifically, Shen et al. (2009) conducted a survey and found that only 10 
percent of the participants often express their view online, while 30 percent of the participants 
sometimes expressed their opinion online.  
Although the engaging level of online expression in China is relatively low, Hyun and Kim 
(2015) suggested that nationalistic attitudes and political online expressions in China have a 
positive relationship. Meanwhile, the use of social media and the traditional media combined 
has a positive association with the level of online political expression (Hyun and Kim 2015), 
which is the same as Rojas and Puig-i-Abril’s (2009) findings that the consumption of both 
traditional and online news has a positive impact on political online activities. Moreover, the 
consumption of traditional and social media could offer a social-interaction function, which 
means it offers a sense of interpersonal communication and discussion (McQuail 1985).  
Hyun and Kim (2015) postulated that digital nationalism offers an opportunity for political 
expression and discussion while serving the same function as a state-led nationalism that 
strengthens the nationalistic ideology. More specifically, Shen and Guo (2013) suggested that 
the mass media, under the control of the Chinese government, disseminate nationalism through 
highlighting national unity and pride. Cyberspace in China also shares the same feature as 
online nationalistic expression, highlighting national unity and pride (Hyun and Kim 2015). 
Hence, the level of nationalism and the consumption of digital media have a positive 
relationship (Shen and Guo 2013).  
Becker (2009) proposed that a country’s elites inculcate national identity and pride into the 
general public to legitimize their right to govern. Even in Western countries, governments 
promote a sense of nationalism and patriotism to tighten their control (Hyun and Kim 2015), the 
same way in which China uses nationalism as a tool to reinforce their legitimacy. Hyun and 
Kim (2015, 767) argued that “nationalism is formed and developed through a political 
socialization process, occurring in multiple venues involving diverse socialization agencies.” 
Hence, digital communication is one of the most vital vehicles for people to develop, reinforce, 
and adjust nationalistic emotions (Dekker, Malová, and Hoogendoorn 2003). The political 
online expression in China reveals features of spontaneity, which can prompt “explicit 
animosity and belligerence against foreign countries, especially when they are involved in 
diplomatic and territorial disputes with China” (Hyun and Kim 2015, 769). Previous studies 
revealed that China’s digital nationalism may challenge the CCP’s foreign policies and promote 
radical state policies (Fang and Repnikova 2018; Leibold 2016); however, King, Pan, and 
Roberts (2017) argued that China’s social media are dominant by means of pro-regime posts. 
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reinforce its legitimacy (Zhao 2004), while online nationalistic expressions reflect the features 
of a pro-regime ideology (Han 2015; Tok 2010). 
Van der Toorn, Tyler, and Jost (2011) posited that people generally express their pro-
regime feelings according to their perception of the existing political system. Hence, when 
applied to China, Chinese digital nationalism and Chinese nationalistic expression highlight the 
development of personal welfare due to the improvement of the national or centralized power 
(Hyun and Kim 2015). This hypothesis was proved by Shen and Guo (2013), in that they 
demonstrated that digital nationalism is positively correlated to government trust among 
Chinese people. At the same time, social media, as a public sphere, offer netizens a virtual 
space to express their sentiment and national attachment to China (Zhang, Liu, and Wen 2018), 
along with symbols like national flags that inspire a national attachment (Butz, Plant, and Doerr 
2007; Carter, Ferguson, and Hassin 2011). However, there are relatively fewer empirical studies 
that explore the tactics underlying nationalistic expression and sentiments. 
Methodology 
Data Collection 
This article aims to systematically examine how the Sina Weibo social media platform is a 
means to facilitate netizens to express their nationalism during the period of the 70th National 
Anniversary in China. However, there are numerous social media platforms in China, such as 
Sina Weibo, Tencent Weibo, WeChat, etc. Therefore, it is impossible to include all the social 
media platforms in China in this research. After much thought, this article utilized Sina Weibo 
as an example for the following reasons. Firstly, Sina Weibo is one of the most popular social 
media platforms in China and had approximately 600 million registered users with around 132 
million daily active users in 2017 (Wang 2018), which could offer systematic data regarding the 
Chinese National Day. Secondly, Sina Weibo, as a digital social media platform, gives users a 
sense of community by providing an imagined community network (Gruzd et al. 2011). Thirdly, 
Oruc (2019) suggested that Twitter provides a range of information, which includes usernames, 
text, visual content, followers, number of followers, and hyperlinks. Therefore, this article 
believes that Sina Weibo, as the “Chinese Twitter” (Ren 2018), could offer the same type of 
information as Twitter. Lastly, due to conveniences related to postings, Weibo allows users with 
diverse backgrounds and locations to use their platform. Hence, Zhang, Liu, and Wen (2018, 4) 
suggested that “Weibo forms a space where diverse ideologies can coexist and compete.” 
However, due to the substantial number of active users on Sina Weibo, this article followed 
Oruc’s (2019) suggestion and examined the Chinese hashtags regarding the 70th National Day 
celebrations mentioned in Weibo posts during the Chinese National Day. Oruc (2019) proposed 
that there is one main benefit for utilizing hashtags, in that hashtags allow researchers to easily 
examine targeted subjects (Mejova, Weber, and Macy, 2015). Moreover, hashtags combine 
“conversationality and subjectivity in a manner that supports both individually felt affects and 
collectivity” (Papacharissi 2015, 27). 
However, it is worth mentioning that the Chinese National Holiday is a public holiday lasting 
seven days. Thus, this article assumes that there are numerous posts regarding the 70th Chinese 
National Day, since there are large numbers of registered users of Weibo combined with a one-
week holiday. Therefore, this article only examined Chinese hashtags on Weibo during the 70th 
Chinese National Day celebrations (October 1, 2019) for the following reasons: (1) October 1st is 
China’s birthday; (2) the Chinese government launched a series of ceremonial events, including a 
military parade, to highlight the National Day of the People’s Republic of China on October 1, 
2019 in Beijing. Hence, this article assumes that October 1st is the absolute day to examine the 
nature of Weibo posts regarding the Chinese National Day as a means to examine nationalism. 
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Day on October 1, 2019, since there are large numbers of daily active users on Weibo. Thus, this 
article set out to find relevant hashtags to selected posts. However, unlike Twitter, there is no open 
dataset for public access. Therefore, this study manually searched “The Chinese National Day” to 
explore posts regarding the National Day on October 1, 2019 to locate relevant hashtags. 
Furthermore, this study clicked on each hashtag to compare their level of popularity to isolate and 
extract popular hashtags regarding the Chinese National Day. 
 
Table 1: Chinese Hashtags on Weibo Regarding the 70th Chinese National Day 
Hashtags English Translation 
#中国骄傲／为祖国骄傲# #Proud_of_China/ motherland# 











Sample and Analysis 
After identifying the relevant hashtags, the study randomly selected 1,562 posts regarding the 
Chinese National Day. Since there was such a large amount of data, the study followed Oruc’s 
(2019) suggestion to pair the data to make the original data more manageable in conducting the 
qualitative content analysis. Firstly, the study follows Oruc’s (2019) method to make a sample 
of a post which was reposted twice or more. The article manually examined all the posts and 
found posts which were reposted. Afterwards, the article categorised each reposted post as a 
group. Next, the study found twelve duplicate groups and 920 single posts (which were not 
reposted). For example, China Central Television (CCTV) used their Weibo account to publish 
a post about celebrating the Chinese National Day, which led to many Sina Weibo users 
reposting the post. Hence, the study grouped them as one post, due to the original data 
containing many of these posts. Oruc (2019) suggested that this step could decrease the 
influence of large numbers of followers, which could ensure all the posts had the same chance 
to be selected. Secondly, the study combined the twelve duplicate groups and single posts  
(n = 920) and created a new database (N = 932). Lastly, the study randomly selected 500 posts 
from the new database. Meanwhile, it is worth noting that the dataset removed the posts which 
were advertisements and links are no longer available.  
This article followed Oruc’s (2019) suggestion to conduct a qualitative content analysis to 
examine themes and tactics. Meanwhile, Özkırımlı (2000) suggested that there are three 
features of nationalism: (1) the nation’s interests and values are more important than other 
forms of interest and values; (2) the nation is the only source of legitimacy; (3) there is a clear 
line between us and them as well as a friend and foe. Moreover, national symbols play a vital 
role in nationalism (Giddens 1985). Therefore, the article examined thematic patterns of text, 
symbols, pictures (Oruc 2019), hyperlinks, and videos to analyse the themes. Meanwhile, this 
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and strategies in Weibo posts. It is also vital to mention that Weibo posts may contain both text 
and non-text content (pictures, videos, etc.); thus, it is hard to use traditional data analysis 
methods (Oruc 2019). Hence, this article followed Oruc’s (2019, 51) suggestion to use a 
multimodal method to conduct qualitative content analysis, since a combination of text and 
visual data could create relevant meaning (Pennington 2017). Meanwhile, when analysing the 
data, the study not only examined data, but also considered any symbolic or connotative 
meanings under a social and political context (Pennington 2017), since China’s political system 
is unique (the CCP is the only legitimate party allowed to govern; Lawrence and Martin 2013).  
Although there are no previous studies on ethical issues conducting research on social 
media, especially for content analysis (Oruc 2019), Bergin and Harding (2016) argued that 
open-access data do not mean it is legal for researchers to conduct research regarding social 
media. However, it is undeniable that it presents major difficulties to gain consent from all these 
social media users while conducting research on social media. Therefore, Fuchs (2018) 
suggested that while conducting research on social media, researchers should ignore social 
media user names unless it is concerning public figures or an organization. Hence, this study 
followed this premise and maintained the anonymity of the owner of the postings (Oruc 2019). 
Results 
This section aims to demonstrate the findings of this article in terms of themes and strategies in 
the posts. The results indicate that the posts are highly charged with national sentiment, 
collective belonging, collective destiny, and the positive framing of the CCP and leaders in 
terms of these themes. Meanwhile, the posts expertly utilize emotional language and visual data 
to express their national sentiments. Official government Weibo accounts also arranged several 
activities to celebrate the Chinese National Day as a tactic. 
Themes 
National sentiments 
National sentiments can be divided into national belonging and national superiority (Billig 
1995; Hjerm 2003). Meanwhile, Hjerm (2000) highlighted the close relationship between 
national sentiments and attachments to the nation (national identity/national pride). Hence, 
national sentiment can be defined as the expression of love, pride, and attachment to their 
motherland and its people (Iveson 2017). Also, Charney, Yeoh, and Kiong (2003) suggested 
that the Chinese national sentiment reveals the Chinese people’s cultural pride and their close 
attachment with China. Therefore, this article ascertained that the posts highly feature national 
sentiments and reflect users’ feeling of love, pride, and admiration for China. Here are some 
examples: 
 I love the great motherland! Proud of my powerful motherland! #Proud_of_China# 
 There is a kind of red, the “Chinese red” 🇨🇨🇳🇳; there is a kind of pride, such as the 
“Chinese flag” 🇨🇨🇳🇳; there is a confession, such as “I love China” 🇨🇨🇳🇳; 
#I_love_China##Happy_birthday_China# 
 It is the 70th birthday of China; I felt passionate when I watched the military parade. It 
made me think that I am proud to be Chinese with yellow skin, brown eyes and black 
hair, and be a son of a Chinese, China 🇨🇨🇳🇳, I love you! 
#My_motherland_and_Me##I_love_China# 
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Some users even linked the celebration of the 70th National Day to the movie lines of “My 
People, My Country,” which states: “My motherland and I cannot be separated for a moment” 
with a picture of the movie’s poster.  
 
 
Figure 1: Poster of the Movie My People, My Country 
Source: Weibo 
National Identity 
Ashmore, Jussim, and Wilder (2001) suggested that national identity is defined as a sense of 
belonging to a country or individual’s identity. The features of national identity are visible when 
citizens can recognize the differences between “we” and “they” in psychological terms (Lee 
2012). However, when applied to the case of China, it is not only about the differences between 
“we” and “they,” but also concerning the unification of Chinese. For instance, He (2012) 
suggested that the Chinese national identity has been conflicted since Taiwan and Hong Kong 
received their sovereign status. Meanwhile, the power of nationalism “locates the source of 
individual identity within a ‘people’, which is seen as the bearer of sovereignty, the central 
object of loyalty, and the basis of collective solidarity” (Greenfeld 1992, 3). Hence, this study 
finds that the posts are highly charged with national identity as the posts reflect expressions of 
individuals who clearly remember their identity, their unification with all Chinese, and their 
loyalty to the Chinese nation. Here are the examples: 
 
 #I_love _China# Only left Taiwan not come back to China, come back, come 
home 
 My biggest pride is being a Chinese🇨🇨🇳🇳, it is an honor when foreigners call me 
Chinese; my happiness is to live in China, I never want to give up my Chinese 
identity, I wish China to be stronger! 
#Happy_birthday_China##Celebrate_70th_national_celebration# 
 I never regret being a Chinese; I hope I could be Chinese again if I could live once 
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 #Long_life_China# I am touched because of China’s prosperity; I am proud of my 
Chinese identity. I love you, my motherland 
 Showing my love to my motherland, while watching the military parade 
#Hope_Motherland_be_prosperous# Sir and Madam protect yourself, I will follow 
you #support_HK_policeman# 
Collective Destiny 
Collective destiny refers to people who are bonded together due to the same interests and fate 
(Zhang 2018); hence, Oruc (2019, 55) suggested that collective destiny could reflect the 
willingness of individuals to “build a stronger country and desire to maintain its sovereignty and 
prosperity as well as commonality of present and future” (Oruc 2019, 55). China is not an 
exception. China’s nationalism highlights the collective effort of all the state’s territories and 
residences to achieve their national goals (Zhao 1998). In other words, the Chinese government 
wants to make the country’s development a national cause for all Chinese (Zhao 1998). 
Therefore, the posts should reflect the use of people’s expression concerning their desire to 
build a stronger China, celebrating China’s future birthday, and maintaining China’s prosperity. 
Here are the examples:  
 
 #Let_us_make_our_Motherland_stronger# This is your birthday, China. I 
dedicate my youth to you and hope China will be prosperous forever 
#Hope_Motherland_be_prosperous##Come_on_China# 
 #I_love_China# We have a home since we have China. Our Chinese identity 
makes us proud, our hearts should be turned to love China, dedicate ourselves to 
making China better, wishing prosperity on China forever 
 What I can do for China to become the most powerful country in the world? The 
answer is being useful to China #Celebrate_70th_national_celebration# 
 No power that can stop China from becoming stronger, I have confidence that 
China will be stronger and more prosperous. God bless China 
#Celebrate_70th_national_celebration# 
The Party and Leader of the Nation  
Oruc (2019) proffered that by analyzing the leader of the country, researchers could examine 
the construction of national unity. For instance, Oruc (2019, 53) examined Qatar’s digital 
nationalism through analyzing Twitter feeds regarding the persona of Qatar’s emir, Sheikh 
Tamim Al-Thani. He suggested that a national leader could strengthen people’s perception of 
the strength, dignity, and glory of the nation (Oruc 2019). China is no exception. Zhang, Mol, 
and He (2016, 17) described China as “authoritarian or paternalistic” since China only has one 
political party to govern. Thus, the Chinese government usually associates a love for China 
equal to having a love for the CCP through their patriotic education campaigns (Zhao 1998). 
Hence, their posts should reflect the use of expressions thanking the CCP, and only that the 
CCP can lead China, as well as thanking the president. This study found that the posts showcase 
Chinese presidents and the CCP in a very positive way. Here are the salient examples:  
 
 It is unnecessary to say too much, must respect the president #Military_parade# 
 #Celebrate_70th_national_celebration# All countries are watching Beijing; all 
countries are watching China on the Chinese National Day. Only the Chinese 
Communist Party can save China, only the CCP can lead China. China has 
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 #Military_parade# We have a respectful leader and president; now he is old so 
we wish him good health and a long life 
 Long live the great People’s Republic of China! Long live the great Chinese 
Communist Party #Long_life_China# 
Tactics and Strategies  
This section aims to examine the tactics and strategies Weibo users employed to express their 
sentiment. Quite often, the official accounts of the Chinese government arrange some 
interactive activities to interact with Weibo users. For example, the People’s Daily arranged an 
activity where users had the opportunity to win a gift if they reposted the post about celebrating 
the National Day. Similarly, CCTV also asked Weibo users to repost its post about sending 
congratulatory wishes to celebrate China’s birthday.  
Meanwhile, individual netizens usually employ a strategy which includes some text with 
pictures as in the examples illustrated below. The netizens usually use symbolic pictures (e.g., 
flags and hearts) to amplify the emotional content of the post. For example, people not only use 
the national flag to express their pride and love towards China, but they also use the CCP’s 
party flags and hearts to convey their feelings. Another popular strategy is the use of pictures 
and videos of the military parade to symbolize China’s strength and the profound changes 
China has undergone in an attempt to finally express their strong sentiment towards China. The 
profile of the Chinese president also serves as a tool to express their gratitude toward the CCP. 
For instance, netizens used visual representations and textual forms to mention former President 
Hu’s greying hair reflected the efforts and legitimacy of the CCP. Against this backdrop, the 
CCP is also framed as the savior and facilitator to materialize China’s growth. 
 
 
































Figure 3: The Profile Pictures of the Former Chinese President and Chinese Premier 
Source: Weibo 
 
In addition to utilizing pictures as symbols, the data show that Weibo users also employ the 
selfie strategy upon joining activities related to celebrating the National Day or merely posting 
selfies to illustrate their joy in celebrating China’s birthday and to express their sentiment. For 
example, on October 1st, a propaganda movie, “My People, My Country,” was shown and many 
Weibo users shared their selfie next to the movie’s poster to express their sentiment for China.  
It is also worth mentioning that the data show that Weibo users’ language is emotional. 
Some posts employ the pronoun “us” or “our” to describe being Chinese and frame China as 
their mother to express their sentiment. For instance, “the world is big, but there is only one 
China, she is huge with 9.6 million square kilometers, she has 5000 years of history with a 
splendid civilization. As a son of China, I am proud. Happy birthday, mother 
#Celebrate_70th_national_celebration#.” In addition to using emotional language, some posts 
also highlighted China’s humiliating history when they went through a time of poverty and 
being brutalized by Western countries, to highlight the significant development of the military 
and economic power of China. One example mentions that: “We didn’t have enough planes 70 
years ago, but nowadays we can fly as much as we want to and as long as we want to. People 
are safe and happy. Our country is stable and rich #Celebrate_70th_national_celebration#.”  
Discussion 
This study sets out to investigate references to express nationalistic discourse, the theme of their 
expressions and the tactics Weibo users utilize. The digital nationalistic expression in China has 
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means that the Chinese government dominates the nationalistic expression through the mass 
media and the educational system (Zhao 1998). However, the online expressions also present a 
sign of there being a grassroots movement (Fang and Repnikova 2018; Hyun and Kim 2015). In 
this case, this article found the same pattern in both the official government accounts and 
normal citizens’ online feedback while celebrating the National Day. For example, when the 
official government accounts published a post concerning the national holiday celebrations, 
normal netizens reposted these, but with comments. Also, normal Chinese netizens posting on 
Sina Weibo shared their emotions and physical experience of celebrating the National Day and 
their feelings toward China. It could be argued that the state-led nationalism, which is promoted 
via patriotic education and the mass media (Zhao 1998), has a positive effect on creating and 
expanding digital nationalism. However, Chinese digital nationalism is becoming increasingly 
more spontaneous (Hyun and Kim 2015). That being said, political expressions online are 
limited in China (Shen et al. 2009), especially concerning issues related to foreign policies and 
relationships with other countries (Zhang, Liu, and Wen 2018). However, this article 
determined that, unlike Zhang, Liu, and Wen (2018), the majority of Weibo users remain silent 
concerning anything anti-regime. Thus, most of the Weibo users express their pride and love for 
China, their gratitude toward the CCP, their loyal inclination toward being Chinese, and their 
bright wishes for China’s future. The same pattern is also found in Israel where the participation 
level of celebrating the National Day in Israel is high (Ariely 2017). Therefore, this article 
suggests that the engaging level of online expression varies according to different topics. 
To celebrate the 70th Chinese National Day holiday, this article discovered that Weibo 
users’ posts were filled with emotion and a feeling of national sentiment. This finding aligns 
with Hyun and Kim’s (2015) idea that digital Chinese nationalism tends to highlight the 
development of China and the improvement of the people’s welfare. This finding also reflects 
Van der Toorn, Tyler, and Jost’s (2011) hypothesis that national attachment often relates to the 
people’s satisfaction of the existing political situation. The current study determined that, 
regardless of the government’s official Weibo accounts, most citizens showed a desire to 
highlight China’s transformation from being a poor country to a powerful actor in the world, 
while using the national flag as a symbol to expand their sentiments. Hence, this article argues 
that a national attachment is positively correlated to the satisfaction of the Chinese government 
through slogans and national symbols (national flag) to express their patriotic zeal. Also, the 
exposure of the national flag increases the people’s sense of national sentiment (Ariely 2017) as 
well as a sense of national identity.  
Previous studies argued that online nationalistic expression carries a theme of Han 
supremacy (Leibold 2016) and an attitude of supporting radical foreign policy (Fang and 
Repnikova 2018). However, this article did not find the same pattern and, therefore, suggests 
that there is rather a sense of all the ethnical groups being a unit and their loyalty to being 
Chinese. Additionally, even with the conflicts in Taiwan and Hong Kong and their desire for 
sovereign status, the posts reflected the netizens’ willingness to unit China with Taiwan and 
Hong Kong. Hence, this article suggests netizens are expressing a clear attachment to their 
national identity and reunifying with Taiwan, rather than supporting radical domestic and 
foreign policies during the National Day holiday. Moreover, the national day as a symbol offers 
some cognitive and emotional knowledge to support the legitimacy of the nation, allowing 
citizens to identify with each other since they have a shared memory and experience. Therefore, 
the National Day serves as an important medium to reinforce a sense of national identity (Ariely 
2017). Also, the Chinese government highlighted the reunification with Taiwan (Chang and 
Chen 2015) and the legitimacy concerning the sovereignty of Hong Kong; likewise, the Chinese 
netizens highlighted their willingness to return Taiwan to China in a very civil manner and tone.  
Moreover, this article also found that netizens expressed a sense of collective destiny through 
wishing that China could be stronger and displaying a sense of gratitude to the CCP and the 
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activities to promote nationalism through patriotic education and the media after 1949, especially 
after the Tiananmen incident. This state-led nationalism highlights the collective effort of all 
Chinese to build a stronger China, the achievements of the CCP, and the fact that support for the 
CCP is indistinguishable from loving China (Zhao 1998). Therefore, this article suggests that 
netizens’ expression of a collective destiny and their gratitude toward the CCP is deeply 
influenced by patriotic education and media exposure. This is also confirmed by Shen and Guo’s 
(2013) finding that the consumption of Chinese news has a positive effect on the level of 
nationalism. Thus, this article argues that these visual and textual posts express the individual’s 
love for China, along with their gratefulness concerning the efforts the CCP and the president have 
made China powerful. There are also references of being proud of China and being Chinese, as 
well as a willingness to see a re-united nation and building a greater China for the future. 
National identity refers to a “closeness uniting those who belong to the nation and arises to 
engender love and loyalty to the nation” (Guibernau 2007, 11–12). Social media offers a virtual 
space for the public to interact, which leads to a reinforced feeling of belonging, solidarity, and 
bonding (Papacharissi 2015; Zhang, Liu, and Wen 2018). Smith (1999) proffered that 
autonomy, unity, and identity are three elements that require the full participation of a nation to 
achieve common goals and their destiny. However, “nation” is an abstract term which is hard to 
materialize (Oruc 2019). On the Sina Weibo platform, China is framed as a mother to 
personalize national unity and identity. Netizens also posted the national flag and the CCP party 
flag to represent national autonomy and unity, thereby strengthening a feeling of national 
cohesion and solidarity (Fox and Miller-Idriss 2008). Hence, this article argues that Weibo 
offers a space to disseminate and interact with shared symbols that offer a space and vehicle to 
create and express a collective national identity and a sense of nationalism.  
Furthermore, netizens utilized pictures to symbolize the significant changes China has gone 
through. In order to express their sentiment, Chinese netizens shared pictures of the military 
parade to reveal their pride that China has transformed from being a poor country to a powerful 
economic powerhouse after the CCP took charge of China in 1949. In a sense, it could be 
argued that Chinese nationalism is rooted in its humiliating history (Zhao 1998). Additionally, 
Palmer (2012, 122) affirmed that “constant reinforcement of belonging is the basis for both 
nationalism and web participation,” which is displayed through the netizens sharing the military 
parade, movie posters, and their selfies to celebrate the National Day. Lastly, this article also 
discovered the tactic of using emotional language, such as painting China as the mother and 
utilizing pronouns such as “us” and “our” to describe Chinese individuals. In other words, this 
implies that the pronoun “we” is one of the most popular words to express a sense of 
nationalism and national identity (Cillia, Resisigl, and Wodak 1999).  
Therefore, this article suggests that national identity is a dynamic social construct, rather 
than immutable, which also aligns with Oruc (2019). Meanwhile, this article also suggests that 
digital media offer a virtual space to reinforce a sense of nationalism and national identity 
through interacting with the users, slogans and national symbols. However, this article proffers 
that the active online nationalism discourse reflects the idea of a state-led nationalism, which is 
promoted by traditional media campaigns and patriotic education. Thus, this article further 
posits that social media, although viewed as liberal in the Chinese media environment, also 
follows the media logic which is dominated by the Chinese government. Also, Chinese 
nationalism is created and mobilized through the interplay between politics and technology, 
which results in nationalistic expressions being incorporated into social media. 
Conclusion 
Through examining 500 Sina Weibo posts that mentioned China’s 70th National Day, this article 
determined that expressions regarding nationalist sentiment dominated on Weibo. Meanwhile, 
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well as symbols and pictures to materialize their love for China and their grateful feelings 
toward the CCP. Zhao (1998) suggested that the Chinese government manages to dominate the 
growth of Chinese nationalism through patriotic education and the media; this article argues that 
there seems to be a grassroots movement within Chinese digital nationalism (Hyun and Kim 
2015). However, it is undeniable that Chinese nationalism is rooted in its humiliating history, 
especially since this and the CCP’s glorious achievements and policies are required teaching 
material in the CCP’s patriotic educational syllabus and reiterated by the media (Zhao 1998). 
Hence, this article suggests that, although the internet might be liberal in the Chinese media 
environment, the Chinese government stills aims to inject nationalism and its interests via the 
digital media, which is accomplished through an interplay between the internet and politics. In 
short, the Chinese digital media, to some extent, follow the Chinese government’s media logic 
to spread the government’s interests. However, it is an undeniable fact that social media serve 
as a virtual space for people to materialize an imagined community as a nation by interacting 
with national symbols. In short, it enables netizens to create and express a shared belonging and 
identity, and finally trigger people’s willingness to spread a sense of nationalism online.  
This article also has some drawbacks. On the one hand, this study explored nationalistic 
expressions and tactics in the social context of the National Day, which may increase people’s 
level of nationalistic expression. Ariely (2017) suggested that the exposure of celebrating the 
National Day has a positive impact on national identification and nationalism. Therefore, people 
may utilize particular nationalistic expressions and specific tactics to demonstrate their support 
on that particular day. On the other hand, this study utilized certain online hashtags and only 
explored Weibo’s posts on October 1, 2019. In other words, it makes it impossible to explore 
different nationalists’ expressions and tactics utilized for the duration of the National Day 
holiday. However, although this article has these limitations, it could still contribute to the role 
of digital media and its influence that helps drive nationalism in China. For future studies, this 
article suggests that researchers could address different topics and incidents to explore their 
expressions and tactics against the backdrop of the complexities surrounding Chinese 
nationalism. Meanwhile, the dynamic role of political issues and business-related issues in 
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